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Introduction
) n , t ( -Secret sharing (SS) schemes were introduced by Shamir [1] and Blakley [2] independently in 1979 for protecting cryptographic keys, and now it has become a fundamental building block in many cryptographic protocols, such as threshold signature schemes [3] [4] , threshold encryption schemes [5] , and secure multiparty computation [6] . In a ) n , t ( -secret sharing scheme, a secret s is divided into n shares by a dealer, and is distributed among n shareholders in such a way that at least t shares are required to reconstruct the secret while less than t shares are insufficient to do that. In a SS scheme, a shareholder is referred to as the member who holds a valid share; when some shareholders participate in a secret reconstruction, they are called participants.
As the most popular SS, Shamir's [1] ) , ( n t -SS is constructed based on a polynomial. In the scheme, the dealer, as a trusted third party, computes a share for each shareholder using a polynomial of degree 1  t . To recover the secret, at least t shareholders are required to pool their shares; each share forms an equation with respect to coefficients of the polynomial. Thus, t shares provide t such equations, which are enough to reconstruct the polynomial and, in turn, the secret. However, less than t shares are insufficient to figure out the polynomial and consequently the secret cannot be obtained.
In addition to Shamir's scheme, other ) n , t ( -SSs were also proposed in the past.
Blakley's scheme [2] is a ) n , t ( threshold scheme based on hyperplane intersections, the hyperplanes of t dimensions allow any group of t hyperplanes to intersect at a single point in a finite field. Massey's scheme [7] uses linear code to split a secret into equal-size shares, the minimal codewords in the dual code completely specify the access structure of the secret-sharing scheme, and conversely. Both Mignotte's ) n , t ( SS scheme [8] and Asmuth-Bloom's ) n , t ( -SS scheme [9] are based on Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), which use a series of moduli in an increasing sequence and define schemes based on a specified threshold range of integers. The range is upper-bounded by the product of t smallest moduli and lower bounded by the product of 1 t  largest moduli. Given 1 t  shares, Mignotte's scheme leaks more information about the secret than Asmuth-Bloom's scheme, but the latter scheme limits the secret in a smaller range when both schemes have the same threshold range. Strong provable statements on the security of the CRT based SS have been studied by Quisquater et al. [10] and improved by Goldreich et al. [11] . Actually, these above basic ) n , t ( -SSs are far from practical. Let us consider the scenario, there are 1 t  participants in a ) n , t ( -threshold secret reconstruction, and one of these participants is an adversary who does not possess any valid share. But the adversary can still restore the secret by collecting enough shares from other t participants. We call the attack Malicious Participant Attack. An obvious solution to the problem is user authentication [12] , which guarantees only valid shareholders can participate in the secret reconstruction. However, this method makes the scheme much more complicated because each participant needs to be authenticated by another one, which means
user authentications are needed among t participants. To prevent illegal users from participating in a secret reconstruction, in 1985, Chor et al. [13] proposed the notion of verifiable secret sharing (VSS). VSS enables shareholders to prove that their shares are valid without revealing them. There are many papers on VSS [14] [15] [16] in the literature. Although VSS can be used to check the validity of each share; but it is very complicated and requires additional information and processing time.
Different from the above schemes, Harn [17] proposed a ) n , t ( secure secret reconstruction scheme using the linear combination of shares based on the property of homomorphism [18] -GOSS scheme employs Randomized Components (RC) to protect shares from being exposed and bind each share with the whole group of participants. Therefore, the scheme ensures that the secret can be recovered only if each participant constructs a correct RC with its valid share and releases it honestly. The scheme does not depend on any hard problem or one way function. Moreover, each shareholder in the proposed scheme has only one share and RCs make the scheme more flexible as well as efficient than related schemes and more secure than traditional
SSs. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are presented in the next section. In section 3, the definition of Group Oriented Secret Sharing is given; section 4 details the proposed scheme. Security analysis of the proposed scheme is presented in section 5, properties and comparisons with related schemes are given in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper. 
CRT was used in the RSA [19] decryption to speed up the process of decryption [20] . Knowing prime decomposition of the RSA composite integer, the complexity of RSA decryption can be reduced by a factor of 1/4 with the help of CRT. CRT was also used in constructing SSs [8] [9].
Asmuth-Bloom's (t,n)-SS Scheme
In 1983, Asmuth and Bloom [9] presented a CRT based SS scheme consisting of the following 2 phases, 1) Share generation and 2) Secret reconstruction.
Share generation: the dealer first picks an integer 0 p and a sequence of pairwise coprime positive integers, , ...
where is the public modulus associated with each shareholder . U i And then it randomly selects the secret in 0 p Z and an integer, ,
The share for each shareholder, e.g., is generated 
Secure Secret Reconstruction
In 2013, Harn [17] proposed a -) n , t ( secure secret reconstruction (SSR) scheme, which ensures that the secret can only be recovered by participants who present valid shares. It consists of 2 steps as follows.
1) Share generation
The dealer 
2) Secret reconstruction
and release it to all other participants secretly. where n is the total number of shareholders in the scheme, t is the threshold and k is the number of polynomials needed.
Definition of (t,m,n)-Group Oriented Secret Sharing（GOSS）
In order to cope with the Malicious Participant Attack in a simpler and more efficient way, we will propose a new scheme. To begin with, we need to put forward the notion of ) n , m , t ( -group oriented secret sharing, give the security requirements and formal description. 
, form a tightly coupled group, where
is a component function in the share space and
is a component set generated from 
Proposed (t,m,n)-GOSS Scheme

Entities and Security Model
Entities
In the proposed scheme, there are 3 types of entities: 1) one dealer, 2) n shareholders and 3) some adversaries.
1) Dealer
The dealer is the coordinator trusted by all shareholders, and responsible for the initialization of the scheme such as deciding system parameters, choosing the secret, generating and distributing shares and so on.
2) Shareholders
We call shareholders participants when they are participating in a secret reconstruction; a participant has a secure channel with every other participant. In the
GOSS, there are n shareholders; each of them receives a share from the dealer via secure channel.
3) Adversaries
In our proposed scheme, there are 2 types of adversaries: (1) Insiders: participants with valid shares and (2) Outsiders: outside adversaries who have no secure channel with any participant.
Security Model
As the coordinator, the dealer is supposed to be honest, which means that it selects parameters to make the scheme secure enough, keeps critical parameters secret, generates and delivers shares securely and so on. That also implies any other entity has no access to the secure channel between the dealer and a shareholder.
As stated above, we suppose there are 2 types of adversaries in our scheme, each of them has different security model.
1)
Outsiders may have access to some secure channels between each 2 participants by eavesdropping and could obtain at most 1 m  components in the secret reconstruction with m participants. In our proposed scheme, components are implemented as Randomized Components (RC).
2) For an Insider, on one hand, as a participant, it has secure channels and thus can receive valid RCs from other participants; on the other hand, some of them may conspire and try to reconstruct the secret with their shares directly. In our scheme, we assume there are at most 1  t Insiders conspiring.
Our scheme
The ) , , ( n m t -group oriented secret sharing scheme consists of 3 phases, 1) Share Generation, 2) Randomized Component Construction and 3) Secret Reconstruction;
1) Share Generation
The 
Correctness
The correctness of our scheme means the secret can be recovered by at least t participants. Let us examine the correctness by the proof of the following theorem. Note that (4-1) is equivalent to (4-2) due to 
Security analysis
scheme, we use RCs to protect the share of each participant because each RC binds the share and all participants' public information together in a secret reconstruction. To reconstruct the secret, adversaries use either at least t shares or m RCs if there are m participants in the secret reconstruction. We will first demonstrate that a share cannot be derived from a given RC by Theorem 5.1. In this case, an Outsider, without any share, has to use RCs it intercepts to recover the secret, we use Theorem 5.2 to prove that an Outsider, even with 1 m  RCs, is still unable to get the secret; However, Insiders, each of which holds a valid share, may try to collaborate to obtain the secret using their shares instead of RCs, Theorem 5.3 will assure us that up to 1 t  Insiders are still unable to reconstruct the secret. If RCs used in our scheme cannot protect shares effectively, given a RC, anyone can get the share contained in it. Therefore, a RC must secure its share such that an adversary is unable to derive the share from the RC more easily than to guess the secret directly in the secret space 0 p Z , which, in turn, means it is infeasible to obtain the secret by deriving shares from RCs. Theorem 5.1 implies that a RC makes the share and all participants' public information inseparable and actually prevents the share from being exposed. Consequently, the secret can be recovered only if each participant has a valid RC (i.e., share) and act honestly. As an Outsider, it has neither a valid share nor secure channels with participants, and thus can only get RCs by cracking secure channels among participants. Our scheme still remains to be secure even if an Outsider obtain as many as Proof: Let us consider attacks in the following 2 cases, 1) the Outsider forges a valid RC, and 2) the Outsider reconstructs a value using the 1 m  RCs. As for the second case, the reason why we just consider using 1 m  RCs is that, on one hand, using 1 m  RCs, (i.e., the most RCs available) can get the most information about the secret; on the other hands, the Outsider, of course, can select some of these 1 m  RCs to derive the secret as it please.
1) Forging a valid RC
If the Outsider succeeds in forging a valid RC, it can resume the secret with the forged RC and the known 1 m  RCs. However, to forge the RC, the Outsider has to obtain the share, e.g., , conspire to recover the secret s , RCs available are less than m , the number of participants in the group. It is known from theorem 5.2 that these ) 1 t (  Insiders will fail if they try to use insufficient RCs to get the secret. In this case, the other way to derive the secret is to directly use their ) 1 t (  shares available. They can do this by 1) obtaining the t -th share either by directly guessing or deriving it from a RC which does not belong to any Insider; or 2) deriving the secret from the value computed from the ) 1 t (  shares.
With respect to 1), it is already known that a new share cannot be obtained with a probability more than Let us consider the probability of 2). To make it clearer, let us refer to Figure 5 
